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Charles B. Renfrewt
In October 1974, I imposed unorthodox and somewhat controversial
sentences upon five corporate executives convicted of conspiring to fix
prices in the paper label industry' in violation of § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.2 Besides giving the defendants suspended jail sentences
ranging from three to six months and fining them from $5,000 to
$15,000 each, I required, as a special condition of probation, that each
defendant "make an oral presentation before twelve (12) business,
civic or other groups about the circumstances of this case and his
participation therein" and "submit a written report to the Court
giving details of each such appearance, the composition of the group,
the import of the presentation, and the response thereto." 3
Although at the time that I imposed these sentences I believed they
were fitting, I could not be certain that they were the wisest alterna-
tive. Indeed, one of the burdens of the sentencing responsibility is
that the judge never knows whether the purposes of his sentences are
appropriate, let alone whether the purposes will be achieved. The
erosion of many of our assumptions about wise penal policy has
created a crisis of confidence in the administration of justice, which no
one feels more keenly than a sentencing judge. Yet crimes continue to
be committed, convictions continue to be obtained, and judges con-
tinue to be faced with the problem of fashioning appropriate sen-
tences for individual defendants.
This article describes the reasoning underlying my imposition of
* I wish to express my gratitude to my law clerks, Jane E. Genster, Daniel H. Bookin,
Tyler A. Baker, and Paul W. Sugarman, for their invaluable assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
t Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
1. See, e.g., Judgment and Order of Probation and Fine, United States v. Blanken-
heim, No. CR-74-182-CBR (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
The case from which these sentences arose is hereinafter referred to as the "paper label
case."
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among tile several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. "
3. Judgment and Order of Probation and Fine, United States v. Blankenheim, No.
CR-74-182-CBR (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Tie
pertinent language in the Judgment and Order of Probation and Fine against each
defendant is identical.
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the paper label sentences. It also discusses my effort to assess the im-
pact of the sentences by eliciting comments from those who heard the
defendants speak and from other members of the legal and business
community. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the body
of knowledge concerning the efficacy of sentencing decisions and to
encourage other judges to become more active participants in evalu-
ating the sentences they impose.
I. The Paper Label Sentences
A. The Offense
The paper label case involved a classic violation of the antitrust
laws. The paper label industry manufactures the paper labels that
are affixed to the containers of a variety of canned and bottled
products. Many of the companies in the industry are small in com-
parison to their customers. The possibility that purchasers will shift
to another more competitive supplier forces companies in the in-
dustry to keep their costs and prices as low as possible. In general,
this is the type of economic situation that the competitive economic
model predicts and that the antitrust laws seek to encourage.
Although such a market structure engenders remarkable efficiency,
it places the businessmen involved under constant pressure to retain
their market positions. As a result, no matter how strongly business-
men support competition in theory, they often tend to be considerably
less enthusiastic when the competition is directed against their own
companies. Manufacturers of paper labels responded to the competi-
tive conditions in their industry by expanding casual social contacts
at trade association meetings to include the exchange of increasingly
explicit information concerning pricing decisions and policies. These
exchanges of information eventually resulted in a division of the
market through pricing agreements. The scheme collapsed when a
disgruntled former employee revealed the illegal practices, leading to
a number of private treble damage actions and a criminal indictment.
The indictment charged that the nine corporate and eight in-
dividual defendants had agreed, inter alia, "to obtain, prior to sub-
mitting a bid or price quotation to a particular account, information
regarding bids, price quotations, or prices currently in effect at that
account from the member of the conspiracy who has previously sub-
mitted bids or price quotations to, or is currently supplying, that ac-
count" and further, "to refrain from competing for all or part of the
label business of customers supplied by another member of the
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conspiracy. '4 Before trial, all eight of the individual defendants moved
to change their pleas from not guilty to nolo contendere.5 Because the
private civil actions had preceded the criminal action in this case,6 and
because the Government did not object to the change of plea,
7 I
accepted the new pleas and proceeded to consider suitable sentences.
B. The Sentencing Decision
For me, this classic violation posed an extremely difficult sentencing
decision. A sentencing judge's recognition that imprisonment may be
a necessary response to criminal activity often creates a tension be-
tween his sense of duty to society and his concern for the individual
defendant. In the instant case, this tension was especially great be-
cause, in my view, the only theory of punishment that could justify
imprisoning the defendants was one of general deterrence.
All of the defendants were community leaders of previously un-
sullied reputation who held top executive positions in their corpora-
tions. My personal observation of the impact of the prosecution on
these defendants convinced me that they did not present a threat of
continued violations. Thus, imprisonment could not be justified in
terms of such typical sentencing objectives as specific deterrence and
isolation. Similarly, in-prison rehabilitation was not at issue because
4. Indictment at 4, United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., No. CR-74-182-CBR (N.D. Cal.,
filed Mar. 12, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
5. In addition, eight of the nine corporate defendants pleaded nolo contendere, and
the ninth was found guilty at trial. The corporate defendants were fined from S10,000
to $50,000 each. The three individual defendants who were not required to make speeches
were fined from $4000 to $7500 and received suspended jail sentences ranging from three
to six months.
My exclusion of these three defendants from the speechmaking requirement did not
stem from an assessment of their relative culpability for the price-fixing activity. As this
article makes clear, the obligation to give presentations was designed not to punish those
convicted but rather to promote general deterrence. Because I felt that these three
defendants could not effectively communicate the message that I wanted conveyed, I
did not impose the same duty upon them as upon the others.
6. Had the criminal action preceded the private civil suits, I would have been less
inclined to accept pleas of nolo contendere. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) (Supp. V 1975), provides that a final judgment against a defendant in a govern-
ment antitrust enforcement suit shall be prima facie evidence against that defendant in
a subsequent suit by another party. See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
340 U.S. 558 (1951). Antitrust plaintiffs may not, however, use a prior judgment as
prima facie evidence if the defendant pleaded nolo contendere. See City of Burbank v.
General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 1964); Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
and Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541, 561
& n.81 (1976).
7. In my experience the Government regularly opposes the entry of nolo contendere
pleas to offenses that it believes are particularly serious. Thus, the Government's agree-
ment to such pleas cannot help but have an important impact on the sentencing decision.
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the defendants needed neither psychological counseling nor vocational
training.
Retribution did not mandate the incarceration of the defendants
because the hardship resulting from the prosecution itself and the
fines that I intended to impose constituted sufficient expiation for
the violations that had occurred. Being prosecuted placed a con-
siderable emotional burden on the defendants. Furthermore, the cost
of counsel had been great and had been borne individually, and the
fines that I would impose were large relative to the defendants' ability
to pay. According full weight to the societal importance of the anti-
trust laws-an importance emphasized by the recent enactment of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, which makes such violations
felonies rather than misdemeanors 8-I believed that the monetary
exactions alone constituted firm and proportionate punishment.
Determining whether these fines would best serve general deterrence
was for me the hard issue. Given the difficulty of detection and proof
of criminal violations of the antitrust laws, a judge must use every
sentencing opportunity to maximize the deterrence of potential vio-
lators. The sentences should be sufficiently harsh to discourage similar
criminal activity; too lenient a sentence might depreciate the serious-
ness of the offense and encourage other violations.
Prior to sentencing in the paper label case, I tried to gauge the
impact the imposition of fines would have on the community at large,
and particularly on the business community, where other price-fixing
violations might occur. Although I considered the prospective mone-
tary penalties punitive, I was concerned that the leniency of the fines,
compared to incarceration, might actually have a provocative effect
on those who learned of the sentences. This possibility troubled me,
particularly because the potential offenders were primarily business-
men, individuals who customarily calculate expectation of profit as
compared to risk of loss. To the extent that certain of these individuals
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
Despite the seriousness of antitrust violations, I find a blanket comparison between
these crimes and other felonies inappropriate. I believe that crimes of violence are, in
general, much more destructive of the fabric of society than are noiniolent commercial
crimes. The butcher who routinely charges his customers an extra quarter for the weight
of his thumb on the scale surely abuses his position. Over time, his activities may result
in an economic loss to his customers far exceeding the "take" of an average bank
robbery, and, if discovered, his dishonesty would undoubtedly create mistrust and anger
among his customers. Yet, however reprehensible the butcher's conduct may be, I feel
certain that it entails a smaller social cost tlan would result if each of his customers
were stopped at gunpoint and robbed of a quarter several times a week for the same
period of time. Violent crime massively disrupts and distorts the daily social intercourse
among human beings upon which any Niable society depends. While the two kinds of
crime may hase a similar economic impact, and may both instill some apprehension in
the public, the psychological effect of violent crime is clearly more pernicious.
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are otherwise disposed to violate the law, a perceived diminution in
the sanction could have the effect of encouraging violations. 9
General deterrence requires both that an unpleasant punishment be
imposed upon wrongdoers and that the public have a relatively high
degree of knowledge about the activities proscribed by law and the
sentences imposed for its violation. After careful consideration, al-
though not without reservation, I decided that the sentences I
eventually imposed met these requirements. The emotional and
financial burden of the prosecution, the fines imposed, and the de-
fendants' embarrassment in appearing before groups of their peers as
convicted criminals would supply the deterrent sting. The require-
ment that the individual defendants give speeches about their ex-
periences promised greater public awareness of the demands of the
law and the consequences of its violation. I expected that media
coverage of the sentences would convey the same message to an even
wider audience. Indeed, the communicative possibilities of the sen-
tences struck me as their most desirable feature.
I would never advocate that a sentence be fashioned solely to create
publicity. I do believe, however, that publicity can serve some of the
more fundamental purposes of a criminal sentence. In cases such as
this, where general deterrence is the principal purpose of a sentence,
it is only logical to attempt to ensure that as many people as possible
learn of the prosecution and punishment of the defendants. Viola-
tions may be deterred by increasing community awareness that a
particular kind of unlawful conduct will be detected and that prosecu-
tion and conviction will follow. Moreover, the need for general de-
terrence appears particularly acute in the field of antitrust, for there
seems to be a widespread feeling in the business community that anti-
trust violations often escape undetected and unpunished.
Of course, I could not be certain what general deterrent effect the
paper label sentences would have. Without data to aid me, I relied on
my own experience and judgment in designing the sentences I imposed.
II. Evaluating the Sentences
A. The Inquiry
During the months subsequent to the sentencing, my actions were
publicized in numerous news reports and feature articles-some highly
9. Of course, corporate crime, like individual crime, is not always based on a rational
calculus. See Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE
L.J. 1091 (1976) (arguing that perception of corporate crime as rational action is in-
adequate and discussing legal implications of otler models of corporate decisionmaking).
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critical. 10 Although the amount of publicity far exceeded my expecta-
tions, it failed to satisfy my curiosity about the impact of my sentences
on the audiences who had listened to the defendants speak and on the
legal and business community at large. Therefore, in the fall of 1975
I began systematically to gather evidence pertinent to an evaluation
of the sentences.
I designed a questionnaire and sent it to all business, civic, and
educational groups that heard one of the presentations. The question-
naire attempted to probe six principal areas: (1) the respondent's prior
knowledge about the antitrust laws in general, (2) the respondent's
understanding of the speaker's specific offense and sentence, (3) the
respondent's attitude toward antitrust violations, particularly as com-
pared to other forms of unlawful activity, (4) the respondent's views
with respect to the type and severity of sentence that should be im-
posed upon antitrust violators, with particular attention to his assess-
ment of the sentences imposed in the paper label case, (5) the re-
spondent's recollection of the content of the speech he heard and of
the speaker's attitude toward his offense and sentence, and (6) the
impact of the presentation upon the respondent's business practices. I
also solicited by letter the views of many individuals who did not hear
the defendants but who are involved with and concerned about anti-
trust. These included the attorneys of record in the paper label case,
other private practitioners, government officials, a number of former
Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
judges, and law professors.
I received 99 completed questionnaires out of a total of approxi-
mately 2700 audience members." To facilitate analysis of the data,
the questionnaire respondents were divided into two categories.
10. Within the first year of their imposition, the sentences received attention in the
following publications, among others: 706 ANTITRUST & TPADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-1
(1975); 689 id. at AA-1 (1974); 16 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2178 (1974); JuM DoctoR, Nov.
1975, at 11; 220 THE NATION 258 (1975) (editorial); Bridgeport (Conn.) Post, Feb. 20,
1975, at 7, col. 1; (Niles, Mich.) Daily Star, Mar. 4, 1975, at 4, col. 1 (editorial); L.A.
Times, Oct. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1974, at 69, col. 1; Palo Alto (Cal.)
Times, Mar. 14, 1975, at 10, col. 1; Redwood City (Cal.) Tribune, Mar. 14, 1975, at 6,
col. 1; S.F. Chronicle, Mar. 10, 1975, at 48, col. 3; id., Feb. 26, 1975, at 5, col. 3; S.F.
Examiner, Feb. 13, 1975, at 4, col. 1; Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1974, at 32, col. 2; Wash. Post,
Mar. 22, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 5. The sentences continue to be cited in discussions of
white-collar sentencing. Eg., Schellhardt, Stiffer Sentences for Price-Fixers?, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 17, 1976, at 16, col. 3; Vhite-Collar Justice: A BNA Special Report on White-Collar
Crimne, 44 U.S.L.W., pt. II, at 5, 11, 14-15 (Apr. 13, 1976).
11. Each defendant was required to estimate the number of people who attended each
of his presentations. It is disappointing that less than four percent of the estimated total
number of audience members responded. I attribute this in part to the method used to
distribute the questionnaires. Because I did not know the names of the audience mem-
bers, I wrote the individual who had arranged for the defendant to address his group
and asked him to distribute the questionnaires to the members of his group. At times
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"Category one" included those employed in the business or firnancial
communities; "category two" included attorneys, academics, students,
editors, and others less likely to be affected directly by the antitrust
laws in the conduct of their own affairs. Fifty-seven respondents con-
stituted the first category and 42 the second. In addition, I received
replies to my letter from 18 of the attorneys in the case, 7 other at-
torneys, 7 federal judges, and 12 law professors. These nonaudience
responses were examined separately from the more structured responses
elicited by questionnaire.
My inquiry did not employ statistically rigorous techniques of data
collection and interpretation. The results, therefore, should not be
taken for more than what they are: an impressionistic canvass of the
views of people in various walks of life about the sentencing of white-
collar criminals. Despite the limitations of the inquiry, I think the
opinions it elicited are worth considering. The more significant in-
sights gleaned from the responses to my questionnaires and letters are
examined in the following pages.1
2
B. The Questionnaire Responses
The questionnaire responses indicate that the publicity engendered
by the sentences did not go unnoticed. Of the persons who responded
to the questionnaire, about 40% in the business category and 50%
in the nonbusiness category had heard of the defendants' offenses be-
this may have been difficult, if not impossible, e.g., where the group consisted of students
who had since graduated.
Another reason for the low response rate is that the questionnaires were not sent
out until several months after the defendants had completed the bulk of their speech-
making. Although most of the speeches were given during the first six months of 1975,
I did not decide to evaluate the sentences until that fall. Because it took time to collect
the names and addresses of the persons who had arranged the 60 lectures, the question-
naires were not distributed until late 1975. Several respondents commented about the
passage of time, indicating that their remarks would have been more complete and
detailed had they received the questionnaires earlier. It seems likely that more prompt
distribution would have ensured not only better recall but also a wider response. Indeed,
one respondent wisely suggested that the speaker should have distributed the question-
naires at the end of his speech.
12. In tabulating the data for this article, I have engaged in some subjective evalua-
tion of the responses. Because individuals sometimes answered a given question in an
unexpected place on a questionnaire, and because some answers that were ambiguous in
themselves could be readily understood only when read in the context of the whole
questionnaire, a simple counting evaluation would have been misleading. Every effort
has been made to include both the favorable and the unfavorable comments. The
frequent variation between the number of reported responses to a particular question
and the total number of survey respondents is due to the respondents' frequent failure
to answer all questionnaire inquiries.
Many of tile persons who responded to my inquiries are authorities of national reputa-
tion. The comments are published without attribution, however, because these individuals
may not have intended their remarks for publication. The questionnaire and letter
responses that are quoted in this article are on file in my office.
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fore attending a speech. These percentages undoubtedly would have
been lower had more traditional sentences been imposed. 13 A con-
siderable amount of other information was gathered by the question-
naires; I shall discuss it under three categories: (1) the respondents'
knowledge of the antitrust laws; (2) the respondents' attitudes toward
antitrust violations and penalties; and (3) the effect of the sentences on
the respondents' business practices.
1. The Respondents' Knowledge of the Antitrust Laws
Perhaps in part because of the prior publicity given the sentences,
most questionnaire respondents considered themselves cognizant of
the proscriptions of the antitrust laws before they heard a defendant's
speech. All but one stated that they knew prior to the presentation
that price fixing by competitors is illegal; more than 75% said that
they were also aware that under some circumstances the discussion of
pricing information by competitors is illegal.
Other information elicited by the questionnaires, however, suggests
that the respondents may, in fact, be somewhat unsure of the content
and scope of the antitrust laws. Many apparently have great difficulty
relating the general requirements of the antitrust laws to specific
factual contexts. Numerous respondents emphasized how surprised
they were to learn that the type of activity in which the defendants
had engaged constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws, subjecting a
corporate executive to criminal prosecution and severe sanctions.
Especially surprising for many was the revelation that specific intent
to violate the antitrust laws is not a requisite element of a price-fixing
violation. 14 As one respondent, an insurance broker, wrote: "I was
impressed by the fact that price fixing, as defined in the law, was not
something that just huge corporations did intentionally. Any business
man in any competitive business could do it, intentionally or not."
Many of those who attended the speeches left with a heightened
awareness of the requirements and complexity of the antitrust laws.
Some were dismayed to discover that businessmen-especially small
13. Of course, it is impossible to ascertain whether the potential increased deterrence
value of the sentences due to their publicization was offset by their perceived leniency.
14. The standard jury instruction on the question of specific intent in a prosecution
for price fixing is as follows:
In order to establish the offense charged in the indictment, the proof need not
show that the accused acted willfully, or with specific intent or bad purpose either
to disobey or to disregard the law.
The element of intent as to the offense charged is established, if the evidence in
the case shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the act or acts of the accused were
voluntary and intentional-that is, that they were knowingly done.
I E. DviTr & C. BLCKNAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE AND INsTRUCTIONs § 23.18 (2d ed.
1970).
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businessmen-are uncertain about what conduct would subject them
to antitrust liability. Some attributed this uncertainty to inexperience
or ignorance in the business community: "I believe there are many
very small businessmen who have almost no knowledge of how price
fixing laws specifically apply to their business operation." Others
blamed the confusion created by many overlapping, complex laws and
regulations affecting every facet of business conduct.
A very common reaction to the speeches was a renewed appreciation
of the need for legal advice in the field of antitrust. One individual
wrote, for example, that the main point he felt the speaker had made
was that "the antitrust laws are so complex and confusing to the
average businessman that nothing should be done without constant
legal advice." Nevertheless, some remained convinced that nothing
could resolve the businessman's uncertainty about the applicability of
the antitrust laws in a given instance. As the president of a small com-
pany wrote,
No matter how moral, ethical or highly-principled a business
man you may be, in today's modern business, the laws are so
detailed and complex that it is impossible to run a business with-
out constant legal advice on every decision, and even this may not
be sufficient to make one secure in the legal sense.
Thus the speeches evidently served a useful purpose by impressing
those who attended with the seriousness of antitrust violations, the
complexity of antitrust law, the need for all businessmen to operate
within the limits set by law,' 5 and the importance of competent legal
counsel.' 6
15. This case heightened my awareness of the need to inform corporate employees at
all levels of the strictures of the antitrust laws. As a result, the consent decree I entered
in the Government's civil enforcement action requires each corporate defendant to
take affirmative steps (including written directives setting forth corporate compliance
policies, distribution of this Final Judgment, and meetings to re'iew its terms and
the obligations it imposes), to advise each of its officers, directors, managing agents
and employees who has responsibility for or authority over the establishment of
prices or bids by which said Defendant sells or proposes to sell any paper labels,
and all paper label salesmen and saleswomen of its and their obligations under this
Final Judgment and of the criminal penalties for violation of [the requirements of
this consent decree]. In addition, each Defendant shall, for so long as it remains in
the business of selling any paper labels, cause a copy of this Final Judgment to be
distributed at least once each year to each of its officers responsible for the conduct
of such business and all paper label salesmen and saleswomen.
Final Judgment at 4, United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., No. C-74-0560-CBR (N.D. Cal.,
filed Nov. 25, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
In addition, for a period of 10 years from the date of entry of the consent decree, each
corporate defendant is required annually to file with the court a sworn statement de-
tailing, and to testify in court through a responsible officer concerning, all action it has
taken during the previous year so to educate its employees. Id. at 4-5.
16. One of the defense counsel in the case expressed his reservations about the help-
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Some of these worthwhile impressions, however, may have resulted
from misinformation provided by the defendants in their presenta-
tions. When asked if the speaker had made clear the nature of his
violation, 78 out of 90 respondents answered in the affirmative. Yet
the textual comments in the responses suggest that many, if not most,
of the respondents failed to grasp the true dimensions of the speaker's
unlawful activity. Frequently the comments stressed the complex,
technical nature of the antitrust laws as they were explained by the
speakers, and the trap that the laws set for ignorant, albeit well-
intentioned, businessmen. Several respondents, in fact, remarked that
the speaker had felt victimized by those laws. Note the following
responses concerning the attitude of the speaker toward his offense:
He was the victim of a vague law which he did not understand.
Everyone else did it. All occurred innocently enough. Fell into it
by succumbing to his friends.
Humiliated-but felt "everyone" does it-so-why me? Why should
I be "hung out to dry"?
At least one respondent even believed that the defendants were held
criminally liable under some theory of vicarious liability: "He was
the President of a company that violated the law and as the President
must bear the responsibility .... He had not been on top of the deal-
ings that were going on in his company and he was responsible as
President."
If that in fact was the picture painted by the defendants about their
particular offenses and their participation in the price-fixing con-
spiracy, it is a markedly distorted one, not supported by the defendants'
statements to the court at the time of entry of the nolo contendere
pleas. As noted above, the indictment in this case charged a widespread
conspiracy to fix prices by exchanging specific pricing information
about specific customer accounts and by agreeing to refrain from com-
peting for the business of certain of a competitor's customers. These
are per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, conduct that all
fulness of typical legal advice in the antitrust field. He pointed out that a prominent
commentator on the antitrust laws advises in his treatise that competing businessmen
may discuss information gathered by trade associations concerIhing such matters as the
cost of a product, the volume of production, the price history of the product, the amount
of inventory, and transportation costs. See E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO
A\TITRUST AND TRADE REGULTION LAWS FOR BUSINESSMEN 32 (2d ed. 1973). As counsel
stressed,
While the distinction [the commentator] makes may be correct as a matter of law,
as a matter of evidence it raises serious problems. With advice like this can the
lawyers (judges) now condemn the clients? No doubt these issues will be even more
serious as we commence to have felony price fixing trials.
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but one respondent knew to be unlawful even prior to attending the
presentation. The defendants were not charged with violating the far
less clear proscriptions against monopolizing or attempting to monop-
olize that are embodied in § 2 of that Act.'7 To be sure, the de-
fendants' unlawful activity evolved gradually, a point rightly em-
phasized by the speakers and recalled by many respondents. But if the
speakers left the impression that they were the unwitting victims of a
vague and technical statutory scheme, they failed to make clear the
true nature of their unlawful conduct.
Similarly, none of the defendants was charged on a theory of
respondeat superior. All of the defendants held positions of authority
in their corporations, and I would not have accepted any defendant's
plea if I had not been convinced that he either knew of or engaged in
the unlawful activity. Certainly, therefore, it is disturbing to hear that
a respondent could leave a presentation with the belief that the
speaker "was held responsible for the crime even though he did not
order such [activity] and was not aware of it until after it was com-
mitted .... [T]he question of whether the party was truly guilty of
any crime comes to mind. . . ." To the extent the presentations created
a false impression of the defendants' conduct and the character of the
antitrust laws, they were counterproductive.
2. The Respondents' Attitudes Toward Antitrust
Violations and Penalties
The questionnaire was designed not only to illuminate the respon-
dent's perceptions of the antitrust laws but also to elicit the respon-
dent's opinions about antitrust violations and about the appropriate
sentences for antitrust violators. Questions on these latter points gen-
erated some contradictory responses. When asked specifically to rate
the seriousness of antitrust violations, all but four respondents stated
that they considered such violations serious or moderately serious.18
When asked to compare the stigma of antitrust violations with that of
other crimes, however, many consistently found antitrust violations
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
18. Respondents were asked, "Do you feel that violations of the antitrust laws such
as price fixing are serious, moderately serious, relatively unimportant, or unimportant?"
The responses were as follows by category:
Category Category
One Two Total
Serious 35 31 66
Moderately serious 15 8 23
Relatively unimportant 2 0 2
Unimportant 1 1 2
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less stigmatizing. 10 Moreover, half the respondents stated that they
believed antitrust violators should be treated more leniently than
other violators of the law.
20
Similarly, when asked directly whether antitrust violators deserve
imprisonment, 62% of the persons in category one and 62% in cate-
gory two responded affirmatively.21 Yet, when asked for their reaction
to the sentences imposed in the paper label case, an overwhelming
proportion of the persons who replied to that question-81 out of 93-
19. Respondents were asked, "Do you feel that a stigma or some social disgrace at-
taches to a person who is convicted of violating the antitrust laws?" The responses of
those who answered affirmatively were tabulated as follows to the next part of the ques-
tion, which asked whether they felt the stigma associated with antitrust violations is
more or less severe than that associated with:
About
Category One More Less the Same
Embezzling from your employer? 7 32 16
Bribing a government official? 6 22 27
Evading federal income taxes? 9 20 26
Bank robbery? 3 49 3
Defrauding purchasers of a product? 7 17 31
About
Category Two More Less the Same
Embezzling from your employer? 2 26 11
Bribing a government official? 2 26 11
Evading federal income taxes? 5 14 20
Bank robbery? 2 32 5
Defrauding purchasers of a product? 3 13 23
About
Total More Less the Same
Embezzling from your employer? 9 58 27
Bribing a government official? 8 48 38
Evading federal income taxes? 14 34 46
Bank robbery? 5 81 8
Defrauding purchasers of a product? 10 30 54
20. Many of those who advocated more lenient treatment explained that white-collar
crime generally warrants a response different from violent crime; they simply did not
view regulatory violators as "common" or "hardened" criminals. Many also suggested
that antitrust offenders in particular deserve special treatment; these respondents believed
that antitrust violators are less culpable than others because the laws themselves are so
ambiguous. A few felt that the motivation for antitrust violations differs from that for
many other crimes: "It is difficult for me to equate violent crimes, such as murder, or
personal crimes, such as embezzlement, with violations of antitrust, which for the most
part I believe occur from ignorance, and not for personal gain."
21. Many respondents quite correctly stressed that the decision to incarcerate an anti-
trust violator should depend upon the totality of the circumstances. Seventy percent of
those advocating incarceration believed that prison sentences are appropriate only for
deliberate and serious violations. Three indicated that prison is appropriate for repeat
offenders. Thirty-five percent of those in category one and 24% of those in category two
flatly stated that antitrust violations do not merit prison sentences.
Nearly all respondents thought that antitrust violators should be required to pay a
fine. The responses to the question, "Do you think that businessmen who violate the
antitrust laws deserve to be required to pay a fine?" were as follows:
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indicated that they agreed with the sentences..2 2 Interestingly, of the
12 respondents who disagreed with the sentences, 9 did so because they
felt the sentences were too harsh. One individual even stated that
"this particular sentence came close to 'cruel and unusual punish-
ment,' because it subjected the speaker to personal humiliation."
The views of the respondents who felt that the sentences imposed
were too lenient are also worth citing. A self-employed commercial
printer felt that the sentences were "much too lenient, in essence all
they amounted to was a slap on the hand .... [I]t seems to me that [the]
punishment was a complete farce!" Another, an adjunct university
professor, thought that the sentences were "extremely lenient"; that
imprisonment was definitely warranted; that the speaker had not ac-
cepted the fact that he had broken the law but "had rationalized away
any guilt feelings he might previously have had"; and that, although
"the speaker was chagrined at having to make his 'confession,' I felt
the lesson he learned was to be more astute in the future." These views
were echoed by an attorney, who also felt that the sentences were too
lenient and who was particularly displeased that the speaker, in his
opinion, "did not fully describe the anti-trust violation or indicate
verbally that anything wrong had been done." These comments not-
withstanding, the consensus of those who attended the defendants'
speeches was that the sentences imposed were appropriate. Although
over half stated that serious antitrust violators should be imprisoned,
only three felt that imprisonment in the paper label case would have
been fitting.
When read together, these sets of responses reveal two inconsistencies.
First, although virtually all respondents considered antitrust violations
to be serious or moderately serious, only about two-thirds felt antitrust
violators deserved to be imprisoned. Second, although two-thirds of
the respondents supported imprisonment of antitrust violators in
Category One Category Two Total
Yes 50 38 88
No 2 2 4
About a quarter of those who responded affirmatively recommended fines only for
serious violators.
Several respondents suggested that the amount of any fine imposed should reflect,
among other things, the profit gained from the defendant's unlawful activity. For example,
one individual urged that the company be fined a sum equal to 25(o of the total profits
it earned during the period of violation. knother recommended that the fine should
approximate "25% or 50% of the value of the business generated as a result of the
antitrust action."
22. In elaborating upon his answer, one respondent stated that he "felt the sen-
tences to be corrective, rather than punitive." Others described the sentences as "ap-
propriate," "fair," "effective," "constructive," "practical," and "creative."
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general, virtually none of the respondents thought such a penalty was
appropriate in the paper label case.
The first inconsistency may reflect some degree of dissatisfaction
with the imprecision of the antitrust laws as codified. Respondents
frequently indicated that the antitrust laws are so imprecise that
prosecution under them is somewhat unfair. Many characterized the
law as a maze of complex, technical rules that poses myriad traps for
the well-intentioned, unsuspecting businessman who becomes "the
victim of a vague law which he did not understand." The respondents
repeatedly emphasized lack of specific intent and ignorance of the law
as troublesome elements in the antitrust context.
It is not surprising that these attitudes underlie the views of many
who found antitrust violations less serious and less stigmatizing than
did the respondents as a whole. A marketing manager, for example,
wrote that he believed antitrust violations are less stigmatizing than
violations of other criminal laws precisely "because of the ambiguity
of the law." For others, the stigmatizing effect was lower because they
felt the antitrust violator lacked specific intent to break the law: "The
apparent lack of attention to the provisions of the law in this case
would seem to make the violation less stigmatizing than a direct and
willful violation such as [embezzlement, bribery, tax evasion, bank
robbery, or consumer fraud]."
The respondents' knowledge about and attitude toward the anti-
trust laws may also have contributed to their seemingly inconsistent
views concerning the type of sentence that generally ought to be im-
posed and the type of sentence appropriate in the paper label case. In
addition, this second apparent inconsistency may stem in part from
the respondents' personal encounter with a defendant in the paper
label case. To decide to incarcerate a fellow human being is difficult.
To maintain a harsh attitude toward sentencing when face-to-face with
the person who would suffer the consequences of the sentence is
especially difficult. The step from the theoretical belief that "antitrust
violators should be imprisoned" to the specific judgment that "this
particular businessman who stands before me ought to be incarcerated"
is one not easily taken.
For many, the difficulty is compounded when the individual to be
punished is, in most respects, an upstanding member of his community
and a person with whom so many of the respondents apparently
empathized strongly. As one stated, "They broke the law but they are
not 'criminals' in the true sense of that word." More emphatic is the
comment of another: "I think the laws and the judges should con-
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centrate more on putting criminals in prison and keeping them there,
than sending taxpayers to prison." The remarks of one respondent, an
insurance broker, are particularly illuminating:
At the dinner meeting where [the defendant] made his talk, I
shared a table with about six other people. All said that at one
time or another they had engaged in the practices that resulted in
[the defendant's] sentence. Two of them (both personally known
to me as decent and ethical men) expressed their dismay that on
that very day they had engaged in a conversation about a job that
one had lost to the other in a bid situation which would have put
them in violation of the law, as [the defendant] explained it to us.
I have often heard that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," but
I feel that maxim must be tempered in times like ours. The body
of law is growing at an alarming (and, in my opinion, an unneces-
sary) rate. When, despite the best efforts of trade associations,
attorneys, accountants and insurance advisors, two honest business-
men can break the law without knowing it, we have a situation
that needs correcting. Had my friends been "caught in the act"
and received sentences anything [like the defendant's], I would
have considered it a gross miscarriage of justice.
The respondents' differentiation of these defendants from other
antitrust violators may also reflect the speakers' inaccurate descriptions
of the conduct in which they engaged. That these defendants may
have characterized themselves, deliberately or inadvertently, as par-
ticularly sympathetic antitrust defendants is regrettable. Unfortu-
nately, I cannot ascertain to what degree the defendants' distorted
characterization of their participation in the price-fixing activity
colored the responses of their audiences.
Finally, the respondents' inclination toward less stigmatizing sen-
tences may have stemmed from their identification with the de-
fendants they heard and their consequently profound appreciation of
the costs of criminal liability. Personal exposure to an individual
being punished for violating the antitrust laws clearly had a significant
impact. Several respondents stressed, for example, that they were
impressed by "the anguish that [the speaker] suffered with his family,"
and the "personal feeling of the speaker's loss of peace of mind and
well-being during the entire episode." One respondent wrote:
I consider the opportunity of hearing this man tell his story as a
very positive one. It is a long way from headlines in a paper to the
thoughts in the mind of the individual involved in the story. The
headlines are soon forgotten, but the severe effect on the in-
dividual involved, as told by him, will remain for a long time.
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Another summarized his views succinctly: "Having seen this man in
person impressed me more than reading about 10 men having been
convicted of violating the anti-trust laws." Several respondents stated
that the very thought that they might ever have to make such speeches
themselves was truly frightening. It was probably sentiments like
these that underlay one of the more striking results of the inquiry:
although three-quarters of all respondents stated that they believed the
stigma associated with antitrust violations would be increased if the
offenders were sentenced to prison, 65% of those in category one and
55% of those in category two stated that prison would be less effective
than the paper label sentences in preventing similar offenses by others
in the future.23
3. The Effect of the Sentences on the
Respondents' Business Practices
The highly personal reactions to the speeches often had a practical
impact upon respondents' business affairs. Respondents were asked:
"What changes, if any, have occurred in your business practice as a
result of the speech?" A significant number indicated that the presen-
tation they heard heightened their awareness of the antitrust laws and
prompted a review and intensification of their compliance proce-
dures:24
Reconfirmed company policy to all levels of management regard-
ing antitrust laws.
A greater effort has been made to teach the law and insist on
compliance within our organization.
We are much more aware of our responsibilities and have double
checked our method of operations.
23. Only 19% of the respondents in category one and 17% of those in category two
thought prison would be a more effective deterrent. One of these explained that "prison
may not be much of a deterren[t] with crimes of passion or extreme need. But it probably
is for people with comfortable incomes who just decide to be greedy." Another wrote
that, although "this sentence did much more to get my attention,... the threat of prison
is the primary deterrent in my mind." And a third, an attorney, stated concisely, "Prison
still is the greatest fear of the white collar person."
A number of persons were unwilling to characterize either incarceration or speech-
making as the more effective deterrent. Four persons in category one stated that the
relative effectiveness of these penalties would depend upon the circumstances of the in-
dihidual case. Three individuals in category one felt that the deterrent impact of the
two kinds of sentences would be roughly equal.
24. Others affected by the antitrust laws stated that they made no changes in their
business practices. Of course, for most respondents in category two the question was in-
applicable because the antitrust laws do not impinge directly upon their particular
business or profession.
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More warnings and wider policy dissemination.
Given far greater attention to all aspects of our business that
could result in any infraction of the anti-trust law.
My competitors and I are a hell of a lot more careful about mak-
ing sure [our prices] aren't followed.
Pricing decisions are subjected to more intense scrutiny.
Significantly less discussion with competitors.
More careful than ever in any business meeting, even with regard
to superficial remarks.
Others described more elaborate changes in business practices under-
taken directly in response to the presentations:
All staff have received written reconfirmation of the general areas
of antitrust law, and copies of the company policies which con-
firm that violations will not be tolerated. There has also been
increased use of company counsel in terms of confirmation of all
major company decisions.
Meetings at all divisions-brought in our attorney to talk at them.
Letter to all management personnel about not supporting covert
activity.
Mandatory standard procedures have been imposed for all in-
dividuals within the company to know and understand the cor-
porate policy that absolutely forbids any price fixing or any other
conditions which would restrain trade. Copies of the Anti-Trust
laws are in the hands of all key personnel and all new employees
are required to sign a statement that they understand them as a
company policy.
Finally, the presentations appear to have generated an effort by
members of the audiences to convey the defendants' message to others.
One respondent, for instance, stated that although he himself had not
changed his business practices, he had "related the speech to other
businessmen as a warning." A university instructor said that he had
tape-recorded the speech and now replays it in each of his classes in
basic marketing. And a business executive wrote:
This talk and the need for increasing the general knowledge of
antitrust prompted me to recommend this subject for the agenda
of our corporate partners' meeting last February. I had the oc-
casion to present [the speaker's] story and the problems of anti-
trust violation to our 200+ partners. It was very well received and
many of the managers have taken direct measures to guard against
such activities.
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These comments are encouraging, for they suggest that the sentences
imposed in the paper label case succeeded to some extent in achieving
the principal objective of general deterrence. It is impossible to know,
of course, whether the changes in business practices purportedly made
in response to the defendants' speeches were fundamental and whether
the speeches will continue to influence conduct in the business com-
munity. It is also impossible to ascertain whether the deterrent effect
of these sentences was any greater than that of other types of sentences
that might have been imposed. Nevertheless, the responses are con-
sistent with the view that the presentations given by the defendants
spurred efforts by certain members of the business community to
ensure that their business operations comply with the antitrust laws.
In my opinion, this finding is significant.
C. The Letter Responses
Because the replies to the letters I sent to attorneys, judges, and
professors were not as structured as the responses to my questionnaire,
they are less susceptible to organized analysis. Although certain at-
titudes were shared by members of all three occupational categories, it
seems plausible that one's position in the legal world might bear upon
one's attitude toward the sentences in the paper label case. Therefore,
I discuss the responses of attorneys, judges, and professors in turn.
1. Attorneys
Perhaps understandably, the attorneys who represented the de-
fendants in the paper label case expressed general enthusiasm for the
type of alternative sentence imposed.25 They repeatedly emphasized the
impact they felt the speeches had upon the business community: "The
impact on the business community and on their legal advisers was more
dramatic, persistent and penetrating than would have been the im-
position of jail terms." Of particular interest were the comments of
several of these attorneys who stressed that, from their perspective as
private corporate counsel, the defendants' speeches were far more in-
fluential than presentations of counsel. One attorney wrote:
25. Although each counsel in the paper label case was asked to disassociate himself
from his role as advocate, "and instead [to] approach the issue from the perspective of
a judge," such a change in perspective is not easily achieved; for some it was impossible.
With admirable candor, two attorneys admitted this to be so. Judging from some of the
comments that were submitted, I suspect that some of the other responding counsel,
though perhaps not conscious of their professional bias, were similarly unable to
transcend their role as advocates.
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Here were individuals who faced the threat of jail, talking to other
business persons about their involvement, and the serious pos-
sibility, if not probability, of a jail sentence.
, These defendants were able to impress their audiences on a
first hand basis, and I am certain that the presentations made
carried far greater weight than innumerable presentations by
counsel.
Another stated:
[I]n antitrust compliance talks I from time to time give to
clients[,] ... I attempt to explain to businessmen the serious na-
ture of the antitrust laws and the horrendous consequences that
can flow from violations of those laws. [A colleague] has char-
acterized that portion of an antitrust compliance talk as the
"rattling the bones" portion. It had often occurred to me that
that portion of the talk could better be delivered by one who had
suffered the consequences of an antitrust violation rather than
[by] a lawyer.
These attorneys frequently cited the extensive publicity given to
the sentences as another of their desirable attributes. One said:
I was particularly impressed with the extraordinarily wide
publicity which the sentences received, not only in the media but
in conversations among businessmen. I very much doubt that a
more routine sentence would have served to disseminate so widely
the Court's message that the antitrust laws must be respected and
that, whatever may have been the situation in the past, the con-
sequences of future violations will entail great personal tragedy
and corporate loss.
Indeed, one of the Government attorneys indicated that he had
changed his opinion concerning the propriety of the sentences as a
result of the publicity they received. He stated that lie had initially
"full[y] agree[d] with the Government's recommendation that certain
of the defendants be sentenced to serve actual jail terms" and had
found the Court's sentences too lenient. But he explained, "After
the wide publicity generated by the sentencing and the speeches I
relented in my original opinion as to this specific case. I believe in
this specific instance the sentences imposed by the Court had a very
great educational effect on the business community." He added, how-
ever, that he viewed the sentences imposed in the paper label case as
sui generis and felt that, if repeated, their deterrent effect would be
greatly diminished. Several attorneys noted that the publicity gen-
erated by the sentences was particularly well-timed in that it coincided
608
Vol. 86: 590, 1977
The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation
with the recently enacted increase in penalties for violation of the
antitrust laws.
Although these attorneys generally agreed that the publicity af-
forded the sentences was valuable, their evaluations of the sentences
differed. Several were worried that the speechmaking requirement
placed exorbitant demands on the individual defendants and their
families. As one stated, "The obligation of giving a number of speeches
... put a heavy burden on the individuals to think about what they
had done and express their concerns. It must have been a difficult and
humiliating thing for them to do .... ." One attorney thought the
sentences were too harsh because they "repeatedly put the defendants
in a very demeaning position." Another counsel disagreed in even
stronger terms, arguing that the sentences "smack[ed] too much of the
self-criticism demanded of 'sinners' by Red China and other doc-
trinaire Communist nations." 2
One Government attorney stated that he believes incarceration is
the appropriate sentence in price-fixing cases "for no other reason
than as a general deterrent to other businessmen who may be inclined
to engage in similar activities." All other counsel of record, however,
concurred that incarceration would not have been suitable for the
defendants in the paper label case, individuals with "excellent records
as citizens and businessmen, . . . religious men with service back-
grounds." The consensus among this group seemed to be that imprison-
ment in this case would have offended their sense of fundamental
fairness. One attorney even questioned the very basis of general
deterrence: "It would have been unjust to impose incarceration on
the individuals involved in the label cases on the assumption that this
would have acted to deter others from acting illegally." Of crucial
significance for many was the enormous toll they felt incarceration
would have exacted:
A prison term could have been debilitating and disastrous to the
individuals involved and their families.
It seemed to me that even the briefest period of imprisonment
would result in a lifetime of shame for him.
Interwoven with these comments is the familiar theme that antitrust
violators are severely punished by the humiliation and loss of reputa-
26. Two attorneys stated technical but serious legal objections. One expressed con-
cern that the spcechmaking requirement "was in conflict with the nolo contendere
pleas and the concern about admitting liability in civil actions." Another felt that the
.sentences might expose the defendants to liability in state courts because of admissions
made in the speeches.
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tion that follow a criminal conviction. As one attorney put it, "A mere
conviction, therefore, is about as severe as any penalty which you can
impose upon an individual of that type."
Despite their beliefs that incarceration would not have been an
appropriate response to the paper label violations, several counsel
in the case stated that they believed the threat of imprisonment re-
mained the single strongest deterrent in the field of antitrust. As one
wrote, "While I do not personally believe that individual violators of
the antitrust laws should be subject to punishment by incarceration, I
recognize the argument that incarceration, or the threat of incarcera-
tion, is the strongest means to prevent widespread violation of these
laws." The real question for these attorneys was not whether im-
prisonment would have constituted a more effective general deterrent
than the sentences imposed-clearly for them, it would have-but
whether the increase in deterrence would have been worth the as-
sumed private and social cost:
Doubtless, maximum jail sentences (like amputation) would
have had a greater deterrent effect at least as to the number of
other persons effectively influenced. I am sure such would have
been at the cost, in some cases, of lost careers and perhaps de-
stroyed family relationships. How one weighs these considerations
is why we hire judges 27
These responses pose an interesting problem. The threat of in-
carceration may not continue to serve the purposes of general deter-
rence if it is never carried out. If fear of imprisonment is really the
primary deterrent, a movement toward alternative sentencing may
itself carry a weighty social cost.
Many other distinguished members of the bar graciously took the
time to write at length concerning their reactions to the sentences and
their views about the antitrust laws in general. Their letters reflect a
broad spectrum of opinion. One attorney expressed "serious doubts
whether incarceration serves any useful purpose in the antitrust field.
... [I] would doubt that the fact that an antitrust defendant was sent
to jail would have much deterrent effect." He believed that,
27. Although this attorney correctly identified the factors to be balanced, I remain
unconvinced that from one week to one month of incarceration, which the Government
recommended in the paper label case, would have left "lost careers" and "destroyed
family relationships" in its wake. I do not wish to depreciate the hardship associated
with even a short term of imprisonment. Nevertheless, I feel constrained to emphasize
that in this case the specter of prolonged enforced separation of the defendant from his
job or family was not a realistic possibility. Thus, in the paper label context, otherwise
legitimate concerns about imprisonment were simply not relevant.
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from the standpoint of deterrence and punishment, what hurts
most is a heavy pecuniary fine. The common impression is that
anybody who works for a large corporation is immensely wealthy.
That just is not the fact, having regard for the tax structure and
the inflation which plagues our society. A $100,000 fine represents
a substantial part of the estate of most executives. It can only be
replaced with after-tax money[,] which is not easy of accomplish-
ment.28
In contrast, another attorney wrote that it has been his firm's ex-
perience "that an acceptance of nolo pleas and the imposition of fines
do not act as effective deterrents to future violations of the antitrust
laws." He welcomed the sentences imposed in the paper label case as
"an effective device to discourage company officials, who often ar-
rogantly regard themselves apart from the mundane antitrust viola-
tion activities," and suggested an additional penalty, "to cause the
corporation to remove the offending officers from the official positions
held and terminate employment."' 0
The reaction among this group of attorneys to the particular sen-
tences I imposed was mixed and somewhat tentative. A few expressed
general approval:
[The sentences] viscerally and doctrinally appealed to me as a
much greater deterrent, if we ever do know how to measure it,
than incarceration in jail.
[T]his is indeed punishment which to some might be even more
humiliating than merely a suspended sentence or even a short
time in jail.
[O]n the whole, I am pleased with this innovation. When I think
of the horrendous felonies that are committed every day where the
lives of the citizens of various communities, especially the large
cities, are daily threatened and result so often in homicides, I
cannot bring myself to believe that the illegal per se antitrust of-
fenses are as venal intrinsically as many of the other crimes com-
mitted with willful intent and often with malice aforethought. I
would not have taught antitrust for some decades had I not had
a firm conviction of the validity of [its] fundamentals, but I also
28. The writer, however, did not exclude the possibility that there might be some
instances in which the gravity of the violation would warrant both imprisonment and a
substantial fine.
29. This sanction was also suggested by one of the questionnaire respondents. It has
been mentioned with approval by several commentators in the field of antitrust, includ-
ing Ralph Nader. See Nader, Introduction to M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, A tERICA, INC. at
xviii (1971).
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feel that when antitrust enforcement overreaches, the backlash
is apt to be more damaging to the public interest than the offenses
themselves.
Others were more equivocal:
I have no objection to or criticism of the [sentence] .... I ad-
mire the innovative thinking that went into the sentence, but a
priori, I would doubt its [efficacy]. As a pragmatist, I reserve judg-
ment and am prepared to temper my views by the results of actual
experience.
And one attorney forcefully expressed his disagreement:
[The sentences] establish a "double standard" for "white collar"
offenders which seriously undermines respect for the entire
criminal justice procedure. Finally, the sentences do, intended or
not, "depreciate" the seriousness of antitrust violations [by]
suggesting that there exists a judicial tolerance for this non-violent
form of theft.
If the only real risk of a scheme which would produce vastly
enhanced, artificial profits is the relatively mild rebuke and em-
barrassment of speechmaking (which at least one defendant came
to enjoy), then I suspect the very human vice of greed will prevail
in most instances. In short, "compromise" sentencing makes the
game worth the candle.
2. Judges
A similarly wide range of opinion is reflected in the letters received
from judges. Two judges declined to express an opinion about the
sentences imposed, one believing he lacked sufficient information to
assess the sentences, and the other remarking how uncertain we all are
in this area: "All things considered, I come out enrolled as student
rather than teacher." Two judges viewed the sentences favorably. One
stressed that, in his view, "compliance with your sentences was
humiliating, perhaps more humiliating than a short prison sentence
quietly served out of public view," but also noted that it was his
customary practice to impose short prison sentences-two weeks or five
weekends, for example-upon income tax violators. Another judge
was particularly impressed by the speechmaking requirement, indicat-
ing that he might impose similar sentences if an appropriate occasion
arose.
Three other judges were in substantial disagreement with the sen-
tences. One voiced a concern mentioned by several others, namely,
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that businessmen who violate the law must not be treated preferen-
tially:
The courts must evaluate these white collar (antitrust) crimes
and if the only effective deterren[t] is imprisonment, then such
sentences will have to be imposed. The term of each sentence
will have to depend upon the gravity of the offense in each case.
The question will always be: How and in what manner was the
public (or consumer) injured thereby and [to what degree does]
the offense [tend] to create disrespect for the law.
As another judge put it:
In candor, I should tell you I have a deep conviction that the
relatively few who are successful enough to enjoy the top material
advantages of our society certainly should not be given special
consideration when they are sentenced for major criminal of-
fenses that adversely affect millions of their fellow citizens.
The strongest disagreement was expressed by an able and well-known
district judge. He wrote:
Jail for "white collar" defendants is the only real deterrent. It
carries a social obloquy and brands the offender for what he is.
It is not appropriate in truly technical offenses, but fraud is
another thing and certainly many per se violations of the Sherman
Act fall in the same category. We judges tend to forget the suffer-
ing of those who are victimized by such offenses.
My experience at the bar was that one jail sentence was worth
100 consent decrees and that fines are meaningless because the
defendant in the end is always reimbursed by the proceeds of his
wrongdoing or by the company down the line. There is no dif-
ference between a nolo plea and a guilty plea except for its impact
on civil litigation....
... I would be unable to sleep nights if I continued to imprison
blacks for nonviolent felony offenses, as is often necessary, and put
white "white collar" offenders on the street. Defendants cannot be
given different treatment because of their education, color or con-
tinued acceptability by clubs and civic groups. Your approach is
not without much merit. It is ingenious. But are you not obliged
to handle common people who forge a Treasury check, fail to file
income tax, cheat Internal Revenue, or engage in some tawdry
swindle the same way? Jail terms need not be long but they make
the difference and I have found they often give the offender a
new perspective on life.
3. Professors
The final group whose opinions I solicited consisted of professors in
the fields of antitrust, criminal law, and business administration.
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Eleven professors responded. Their letters display less general agree-
ment with the sentences than the responses of any other group. This
is not to say that all of them believed that all antitrust violators should
be incarcerated. In fact, three of them were quite adamantly opposed
to imprisoning antitrust violators. One professor wrote: "I view im-
prisonment as a sanction of last resort to be imposed only where all
other methods of sanctioning fail. And I don't believe that the anti-
trust area is one where we do have to resort to prison sentences."
Another stated: "I don't think imprisonment is appropriate for first
offenders except in egregious cases like the Westinghouse rigged-bids
cases over a decade ago. The offenses, however severe from an eco-
nomic viewpoint, lack that moral bite in the general public view
which makes imprisonment appropriate."
A larger number expressed the view that the only deterrent for
potential antitrust violators is a jail sentence. The following comments
are illustrative:
I doubt.., that any sentence which does not involve a term in
jail will really succeed in convincing businessmen that price-fixing
is a truly criminal activity rather than a minor breach of regula-
tions.
Because the offenders may be able to inflict their power on so
many others, and because the aggregate effects may be so large[,]
I believe that strong penalties should be levied on the major
offenders. I continue to be amazed at the shock and horror which
the business press displays when a stiff sentence, including jail,
has been handed down in an anti-trust case. From that informa-
tion I conclude that jail does indeed-in this one area of law, at
least-act as a deterrent.
[A]lthough I am generally very much in favor of avoiding im-
prisonment or jail, and therefore sympathize with your approach
to the sentencing problem, I wonder if a brief symbolic period-
say a week or two-of actual time in confinement might not be
warranted.
Speaking again only of explicit price fixing cases, I would like to
see actual prison sentences imposed and served far more often
than has been the historic pattern. I am not speaking of long
sentences, thirty days would generally be sufficient. The business-
men I have represented over the years are truly terrified of the
prospects of going to jail. My guess is that the prospect of the
thirty day jail sentence carries more deterrent wallop than all
but the most savage of fines.
614
Vol. 86: 590, 1977
The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation
Given these views, it is not surprising that most of the professors
felt that the deterrent impact of the sentences imposed in the paper
label case was inadequate. The following comments are typical:
I am skeptical that any amount of public speech making could
have the impact on the business community that a few well-
publicized jail sentences would have.
My guess, subject to more information, is that sophisticated
corporate officers will regard this kind of sentence as further
evidence that trial judges share their view that antitrust offenses
are a particularly innocuous kind of white-collar "crime," and
that if such sentencing becomes at all common, responsible counsel
will have an increasingly difficult time discouraging corporate
antitrust violations.
More adamant was the professor who wrote that he regards "a sen-
tence that requires a defendant to give a speech or series of speeches
to be no punishment at all. And because it is not punishment .... it
will not deter others from engaging in like acts."
Many of the letters from members of the academic community sug-
gest that their authors share my concern about antitrust violations and
my doubt that traditional forms of punishment are satisfactory but
do not agree with the particular alternative sentences fashioned here.
Several professors wrote that "new and imaginative sanctions are
needed in antitrust cases," and that it is "commendable for a judge to
explore alternatives to incarceration which will achieve a similar
deterrent effect upon others." 30 But the consensus was neatly sum-
marized in the following comment: "Although I applaud your effort
to find a more suitable penalty and deterrent, I confess considerable
doubt that a repeated mea cllpa is sufficient." 3'
30. One writer took strong exception to this view, stating that he was not persuaded
"that it is a proper part of a judge's function to invent novel punishments," that the
1'prescription of punishment is a legislative function," and that he found it difficult "to
justify the kind of discretion that your sentences assume." He also expressed concern
about what he perceived to be the nonreviewable nature of the sentences:
It is no answer, of course, that the defendants may cheerfully accept the less
obnoxious form of punishment, as I gather they probably did in the paper-label
cases. The very existence of the harsh alternative is what induces them to accept
and is what should make us wary about allowing such free-wheeling discretion on
the part of a judge. Perhaps the defendants' own constitutional rights have not been
infringed. . . . But the very fact that they will not complain aggravates the serious-
ness of the situation for potential defendants as a class. It places the question of a
judge's power beyond review.
31. As had other respondents, a few of the professors commented about what one of
their number characterized as "the problem of equality":
Any businessman ought to know that price-fixing agreements are criminal, and yet
it is a fact that even flagrant violators rarely go to jail. The situation is bound to
create an appearance of class discrimination, considering that other types of of-
fenders do go to jail, although jail probably does not do them any good either.
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Finally, the remarks of one law professor, who arranged for one of
the defendants to address his antitrust class and was thus uniquely
situated to evaluate one of the presentations first-hand, are thought
provoking. Having explained his own belief that short periods of
incarceration are necessary and appropriate in price-fixing cases and
that the sentences in the paper label case were ill-designed, he stated:
I find it even more difficult to form any judgments as to the effect
of the presentation given by the individual defendants pursuant to
your sentences. The gentleman who talked to my class was
chastened and shaken by his experience. In one sense he did not
deny at any time that he had discussed prices with his competitors
and had violated the law; and yet at the same time the tenor of
his presentation was that he had not really been fully aware that
anything so customary amounted to a legal violation. And he
was at pains to explain to the class again and again that such con-
duct really was illegal. Reactions among the class varied: some
were skeptical of his implied naivete, and were slightly hostile in
their questioning. Others quite plainly felt sorry for him. But in
legal terms, this was an atypically sophisticated audience. It is
very difficult for me to guess what the impact of his presentation
would have been at a Rotary luncheon or a meeting of the local
Chamber of Commerce. My uncertain guess is that the listeners
would not have come away with increased insight into the wisdom
of the rule prohibiting price fixing or even with deepened resolve
that they themselves would never let themselves drift into such
circumstances.
Conclusion
That this study is markedly inconclusive when judged by scientific
standards is hardly surprising. By its very nature, general deterrence is
susceptible of measurement by only the most sophisticated techniques.
Unfortunately, the techniques employed in this study were crude.
Despite these shortcomings, some tentative conclusions are possible,
both as to what has been learned in this study and as to what might
be learned from future studies.
The sentences evoked general approval from those members of the
business community who attended the presentations and from those
attorneys who regularly counsel businessmen. Other reactions, how-
ever, were mixed. Many of the judges and law professors-individuals
whose views I especially value-were critical of the sentences imposed.
These variations in response may reflect differences in underlying
values and attitudes concerning the antitrust laws and violators of
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those laws. Certainly, no one sentence for antitrust violators would
generate approval from all of the individuals who responded.
A frequent criticism of the sentences stemmed from a perceived
disparity between the treatment of "common criminals," such as those
who steal welfare checks or engage in minor embezzlements, who are
routinely sent to prison, and white-collar criminals, who are not. I
share this concern, but I do not feel it applies to my sentencing. Al-
though I judge each case individually, I rarely impose prison sentences
upon first offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes-regardless of the
color of their collars.32 I cannot and will not adapt my sentencing
practices to conform to those of other judges, particularly to those that
I consider overly harsh.
Were the sentences successful in terms of general deterrence? I can-
not be certain. To be sure, the speeches succeeded in stimulating some
stronger compliance measures by certain businessmen; but the key
question-and the one impossible to answer-is whether those com-
pliance efforts would have been more or less vigorous if the sentences
had included incarceration.
To the extent the sentences were successful, their success almost
certainly depended upon the personal impact of a face-to-face meeting
with an individual convicted of violating the antitrust laws. Although
strongly suggesting the existence of such an impact, this study has not
established how, if at all, the total deterrent effect of the sentences
differed from that of a sentence of incarceration. Nor can the study
indicate the extent to which the deterrent effect of such sentences
might be undercut by their repetition. I tend to believe that the im-
pact of the speechmaking requirement stemmed largely from its
novelty; if such speeches become an ordinary and expected occurrence,
they would likely lose much of their force.
This study provides some guidance for judges who may impose such
sentences in the future. Closer judicial supervision may be necessary
to ensure that the speeches accurately describe the conduct for which
the defendant was criminally penalized. Furthermore, judges may
wish to require the defendant to address audiences concerned with
the laws that were violated.
32. I frequently do impose prison sentences upon first offenders convicted of certain
serious crimes, such as widespread trafficking in a controlled substance like heroin. I
do not, however, view narcotics distribution as a non'iolent crime. A large-scale drug
dealer and his organization routinely engage in violence to safeguard and carry out
their operation, and their product inevitably invades the physical and psychological in-
tegrity of its consumers.
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To evaluate the impact of sentencing decisions is difficult, but it
is imperative that judges attempt to do so. To improve the quality of
such evaluation, I urge greater cooperation between the courts and
those social scientists trained and experienced in the necessary em-
pirical techniques. The demands of research must, of course, never be
allowed to dictate the sentencing decision itself. No defendant should
ever be made a guinea pig, sentenced solely to facilitate empirical
study. Every sentence must be justifiable on its own terms. Certainly,
however, scientifically sound evaluation of the sentences that are im-
Posed would increase the knowledge that judges bring to sentencing
decisions. We all can benefit from more rigorous examination and
discussion of both the sound and the faulty decisions of sentencing
judges.
